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Local ﬁnancing of public schools in the U.S. leads to a bundling of two distinct choices -
residential choice and school choice - and increases the degree of socioeconomic segregation
across school districts. A school ﬁnance reform can go a long way in weakening this link. In
this paper I study the Michigan school ﬁnance reform of 1994 (Proposal A) which resulted
in a comprehensive equalization of per pupil expenditures. Using panel data on Michigan
K-12 districts and data from the decennial censuses I investigate whether the reform had
any signiﬁcant eﬀects on spatial segregation. I ﬁnd that Proposal A has been responsible for
increases in housing stock and property values in the lowest spending school districts, and
for improvements in several socioeconomic indicators, implying a decline is neighborhood
sorting. However, there is continued high demand for residence in the highest spending com-
munities, which points to the importance of neighborhood peer eﬀects (‘local’ social capital).
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Local ﬁnancing of public schools is one of the distinguishing features of the K-12 educational
system in the U.S. A substantial share of the total funds for educational expenditures is raised at
the local school district level, primarily by taxes levied on property.1 This leads to a bundling of
two distinct choices - residential choice and school choice. Parents in the U.S. often choose their
houses on the basis of desirable schools in the locality. Since demand for a good education and
its aﬀordability are increasing in income and educational attainment, this increases the degree of
economic and demographic segregation across school districts. A school ﬁnance reform, loosely
interpreted as an equalization of school ﬁnances within state boundaries, can go a long way
towards weakening this link between housing choice and choice of schools. It may result in a
signiﬁcant dilution of the extent of socio-economic stratiﬁcation, which in turn aﬀects house
prices and property values. In this paper I study the Michigan school ﬁnance reform of 1994
which resulted in a large and comprehensive equalization of per pupil expenditures within the
state. I investigate whether the reform had any signiﬁcant eﬀects on housing stock, property
values and inter-district movements of households, and any resultant changes on residential
sorting in the state.
In 1994, Michigan embarked on a comprehensive overhaul of its school ﬁnance program when
it enacted a new plan called Proposal A. This reform signiﬁcantly increased the state share of
K-12 spending and entailed shifting large sums of money to the lowest spending districts, which
were allowed to increase their spending at a much faster rate than others. Concurrently, Proposal
1 In 1999-2000, the share of revenues for public elementary and secondary schools that was raised locally was
43.2% (National Center for Education Statistics, 2003, Table 156).
1A also ended local discretion over school spending. Given spending in 1993-94, the last year
before the program, it is the state that now decides by how much each district can raise its
subsequent expenditures. The highest spending districts in the state were held harmless, that
is, they did not witness any actual decline in per pupil spending, but were constrained in future
increases.
In economics there is a long tradition of interest in residential locations of households, much
of which originates from the classic work by Tiebout (1956). Tiebout hypothesized that if
people are free to choose where to reside among many competing jurisdictions this would ensure
eﬃciency in the provision of ‘local’ public services. Given that people would vote ‘with their feet’
if not satisﬁed with the existing level and cost of these services (which may include education,
police, ﬁre safety, parks, etc.), competition for potential families would eliminate the ineﬃcient
producers.
Later work has shown that some of the implications of Tiebout’s hypothesis hold only under
stringent assumptions,2 but the basic insight is a powerful one - competition for customers will
ensure the eﬃcient provision of local public goods, something that is often very diﬃcult for
other (non-local) public goods. This has spawned a large literature on residential choice and
resultant spatial segregation, and its eﬃciency properties, particularly as it relates to investment
on education - see e.g. Benabou (1996a, 1996b), Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) and Barrow
and Rouse (2004).
The focus of an important strand of this literature has been to estimate the marginal willing-
2 See, for example, Bewley (1981) and Westhoﬀ (1977).
2ness of households to pay for school quality. The general conclusion is that parents are willing
to pay a substantial price for ‘desirable’ schools. Black (1999) ﬁnds that parents are willing to
pay 2.5 percent more for a 5 percent increase in test scores. Barrow (2002) estimates that in
the Washington D.C. area white households with children are willing to pay $1800 more per
year for schools generating a 100 SAT point advantage. Downes and Zabel (2002) use data on
house prices and school characteristics in Chicago from 1987 to 1991 to show that the elasticity
of home values with respect to test scores is approximately equal to one.
In an important contribution, de Bartolome (1990) shows that in a community model with
a mobile population and public (school) expenditures set by voting, communities may become
heterogeneous in composition and second-best ineﬃcient. He shows that a social planner can
eﬀect a Pareto improvement by choosing higher inputs in the less desirable communities (urban
cities) - something very similar in principle to a school ﬁnance reform. However, though there
have been some studies of the eﬀect of school ﬁnance reforms on resource equalization and
academic performance,3 to date there has been few systematic evaluations of the impact of these
programs on socioeconomic segregation. Nechyba (2003) sets up a general equilibrium model
that links schools and housing markets, and conducts simulation exercises calibrating his model
to data from New Jersey. He ﬁnds that state ﬁnancing leads to a small decline in residential
segregation compared to local ﬁnancing. Dee (2000) looks at whether in states with school
ﬁnance reforms encouraged by state court rulings the new resources have been capitalized into
housing values and residential rents within the beneﬁciary districts. He ﬁnds that the increases
3 See, among others, Card and Payne (2002), Clark (2003), Downes (1992, 2002), Murray et al (1998), Roy
(2004).
3in state aid generated by court mandates substantially increased median housing values and
residential rents. Aaronson (1999) studies whether school ﬁnance reforms alter neighborhood
income heterogeneity. He ﬁnds that school ﬁnance has a signiﬁcant eﬀect on school district
income sorting, especially among low-income communities. This is among the ﬁrst papers to
empirically examine the eﬀect of a major school ﬁnance reform on economic and demographic
stratiﬁcation, and should provide important evidence as to its impact.4
Using annual data on housing stock and property values from the Michigan Department of
Education I ﬁnd that there was a positive eﬀect of the school ﬁnance reform on these variables
in the lowest spending districts. But the results also suggest a continued high level of demand
for residence in the highest spending communities. The regressions run on decennial census
data show signiﬁcant improvements in the lowest spending districts in several socioeconomic
indicators, particularly in the income and employment variables. However, here also the highest
spending districts continue to maintain their superiority. Finally, when I look at within-state
migration in the ﬁve years after the program, there do not seem to be any signiﬁcantly larger
inﬂows to the lowest spending districts, who are the chief beneﬁciaries of the new system. I
argue in the paper that presence of neighborhood peer eﬀects can be an important explanation
for the pattern evident in the data. Such factors, often referred to in the literature as ‘local’
social capital and perceived to be quite strong, can have a dampening eﬀect on the equalizing
4 Dee’s analysis only concerns the states with court-mandated school ﬁnance reforms - in Michigan the drive
for change was led entirely by the legislature and the executive. This diﬀerence has been argued to be signiﬁcant
for the resultant resource equalization, so the eﬀects on segregation too can be quite diﬀerent. Aaronson argues
that one implication of the Tiebout model is that within-community homogeneity declines as a result of limits on
the discretion of school districts to set their expenditure levels, but this generally does not follow. Both of these
studies include data only upto the 1990’s, mainly the 1990 and previous censuses.
4forces of even a comprehensive school ﬁnance reform.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 I outline the main features of
the Michigan program, with particular emphasis on the pre-reform scenario and the implications
of the program for changes in segregation. Section 3 discusses the sources of data used. In
Section 4 I set up a theoretical framework to intuitively discuss the impact a school ﬁnance
reform might have on residential segregation. Section 5 contains the results. I ﬁrst present some
results on values of housing stock across diﬀerent school districts in the pre and post-reform
period. Next I use the decennial census data to estimate changes in socioeconomic indicators.
Finally I present some estimates of the inﬂows of population into diﬀerent districts since 1995.
Section 6 concludes. In an appendix I provide evidence that the results in Section 5 based on
decennial censuses in 1990 and 2000 are robust to controlling for pre-existing trends from the
1980 census. References and tables follow.
2 The Michigan Program
2.1 Michigan Before the Program
Prior to Proposal A, Michigan had been using a district power equalizing (DPE) formula, where
districts were allocated state funds based on their tax eﬀorts. This was intended to make the
system wealth-neutral,5 leaving the choice of millage rates (property tax rates) to the local
districts, but its equalizing power had considerably eroded over the years. In 1994 about one-
5 The idea behind wealth-neutrality is that high tax wealth in a district should not lead to high revenues
except through a higher tax eﬀort. In general, as demand for school spending is a positive function of income,
this does not equalize per pupil expenditures across districts, see Feldstein (1975).
5third of all districts were too rich to be aﬀected. At the same time, there was a heavy reliance on
local property taxes as the source of school revenues. In 1994, just before the reform, Michigan’s
property tax burden was the seventh highest in the country and it was fourth among US states
in the share of school spending ﬁnanced locally (61%).6 In fact, the Michigan school ﬁnance
reform was not a response to any adverse court ruling, unlike most such reforms, or to a sudden
rise in public concern over spending inequalities. Rather, it was a by-product of the prevailing
debate over pervasively-high property taxes, whose main purpose was supporting local schools.
There are 524 K-12 school districts in Michigan,7 each of which is ﬁscally independent.
This, coupled with the predominance of local control in school aﬀairs, presumably ensured,
or at least aggravated, socio-economic segregation along district lines. Table 1 provides some
illustrative evidence on the extent of within-county disparities in income distribution in pre-
reform Michigan. The 1990 decennial census reported the value of median household income for
each school district - I show the maximum and the minimum values of district median income
for each of the counties which have more than 10 school districts.8 As can be seen, there were
very signiﬁcant diﬀerences in incomes between the richest and the poorest school districts in
each county. Other than Jackson county, in all of the other counties the richest school district
has a median income almost twice as high as that of the poorest district, often even higher.
The diﬀerentials are higher for counties which have more school districts, thereby allowing for a
6 The three states with a higher share of school expenditures ﬁnanced locally in 1994 were New Hampshire
(86%), Illinois (62%) and Vermont (61%) - later in 1997 both Illinois and Vermont overhauled their school ﬁnancing
laws.
7 There are an additional 31 non K-12 districts.
8 There are 83 counties in Michigan, 14 of them have more than 10 school districts each and are included in
this table. For example in 1989, of the 14 school districts in Berrien county, Lakeshore School District, the richest
district, had a median income of $37,367 while Benton Harbor Area Schools, the poorest, had a median income
of only $16,742, a diﬀerence of $20,625 (223%).
6larger degree of stratiﬁcation. The pre-reform situation thus closely corresponds to a Tiebout-
type sorting of households into desired (educational) jurisdictions.9
Fernandez and Rogerson (1996) provides some additional evidence on the extent of disparities
in per pupil expenditures within neighboring communities in pre-reform Michigan. Focusing on
the Detroit Metropolitan Area, they show that in 1986-87 Bloomﬁeld Hills school district was
spending about $7000 per child, whereas Dearborn school district, at the other end of the
spectrum, spent much less than $3000 (Table 2, page 136).
2.2 The Michigan Program
In March 1994 Michigan voters overwhelmingly ratiﬁed Proposal A, which reduced the reliance
of school revenues on property taxes, replacing them primarily by an increase in the sales tax
from 4% to 6%. This resulted in a large rise in the state share of K-12 spending, from 31.3%
in 1993 to 77.5% in 1997, and was followed by eﬀorts to make a signiﬁcant dent in existing
inequalities.
The new school spending plan, eﬀective from 1994-95, works as follows. First, the 1993-
94 level of spending in each district was taken as its base, and came to be called the district’s
Foundation Allowance (FA). Second, future increases in all districts’ FA’s were governed entirely
by the state legislature - the lowest spending districts were allowed to increase spending at much
faster rates than their richer counterparts. In theory, over time this would lead to a substantial
9 Not surprisingly, these large diﬀerences in median incomes translated into large diﬀerences in per pupil
expenditures, as can be seen in the following columns. In Roy (2004, Table 3) I found that there was a large and
positive relationship between district income and school spending in Michigan in the pre-reform period (1990-
1994).
7narrowing of the revenue gap across districts. Further, all districts, however rich, were held
harmless - none suﬀered any absolute decline in per pupil spending. Table 2 shows the changes
in expenditures in six Michigan school districts in the post-reform period. The large catch-up
exhibited by the lowest spending districts is immediately evident.
One important characteristic of the Michigan reform is that it was staggered over several
years and that all districts, however rich, were held harmless. This has an interesting implication.
Though parents cannot spend any extra money10 in the districts they are currently residing in,
they can move to a higher spending district, which will continue to have higher expenditures for
the next few years because of the hold-harmless clause. This may imply a high level of demand
for residences in the higher-spending communities. While the large increases in state aid to the
lowest-spending districts make them more attractive as potential residences, it is intriguing to
note that the highest spending districts too may continue to attract parents for years to come.11
When I discuss the regression results, I shall try to see whether there is any evidence for such
two-sided movements.
3 Data
All the data that I use are at the level of individual K-12 school districts. Most of these come
from the Michigan Department of Education. The revenue and expenditure ﬁgures, as well
as those on K-12 enrollment, are taken from the Bulletin 1014’s, published annually by the
10 over and above what is authorized by the state
11 Simple calculations from the ﬁgures in Table 2 show that it will take Standish-Sterling and Delton-Kellogg
school districts another 10-15 years to reach a level of spending similar to that in Warren Woods. This is a
much longer horizon than parents with school-age children would typically have. (Even at the current rate of
equalization, these districts may not catch up to Grant Township until another 25 years or so.)
8department. Data on the housing stock variables are also taken from this source, which give
the exact deﬁnitions for the particular variables used in the calculations. Note that prior to the
reform, i.e. till 1994, the bulletins did not separately report the values of homestead housing
stock and non-homestead housing stock, since these were taxed at a uniform rate.
The data for some of the control variables, like racial composition of the school districts,
come from the Common Core of Data (CCD), a statistical database maintained by the National
Center for Education Statistics (NCES). The relevant data from the 2000 decennial census have
also been taken from this site. I use the 1980, 1990 and 2000 censuses to look at changes in
socio-economic and demographic characteristics of Michigan school districts - the data for 1980
and 1990 censuses are from the respective School District Data Books.
4 Theoretical Background
The literature on residential locations and sorting, particularly as it relates to school choice,
rests on two main assumptions. The ﬁrst is that people are completely mobile, and that they
have a large number of possible jurisdictions to choose from.12 The second assumption is that
diﬀerent people have diﬀerent preferences over educational spending. This can follow from the
assumption that diﬀerent people have diﬀerent incomes and because education is a normal good,
richer people can aﬀord and consume more educational attainment. But this may also be a result
of diﬀerences in intrinsic preferences for education.
Under these assumptions, in residential equilibrium there will be sorting by either income or
12 That is, people can choose from a number of school districts without transportation or other costs featuring
prominently in the decision.
9demand. I discuss these in what follows. Models with sorting by income are more popular in
the literature, so I focus mostly on income sorting.13
Sorting by Income
I assume that education is a normal consumption good, so that richer people consume more
of it. Ceteris paribus, a higher educational outcome is a positive function of (i) a higher school
spending, and (ii) a better peer group at the school and neighborhood. I also assume that peer
group is equal to the average achievement of a school’s student body, and that richer people
have children who have higher achievement (income and achievement are monotonically related,
so that living with richer people increases one’s educational outcomes).14
Under these assumptions, there will be stratiﬁcation by income across school districts. First,
consider (i), a higher school spending. People will tend to cluster together, since under local
discretion over school expenditures people will tend to choose communities which spend the
same amount of money on education that they themselves would have chosen. With aﬀordability
of higher education expenditures closely aligned with income this results in segregation along
district boundaries.
Similarly under (ii), if peer eﬀects have a strong positive inﬂuence on academic achievement,
richer people, who are also the people with a higher demand for education, would be inclined to
pay more for residences in communities which have more favorable peer groups. In other words,
13 The predictions of models with sorting by demand are very similar to those with sorting by income, at least
as far as residential segregation is concerned.
14 The latter is a simple way of modeling the fact that living with richer people often provides important inputs
that are complementary to education, viz. motivation, connections to important places and people, crime-free
environment, etc.
10they would outbid poorer people for the more attractive communities - since ‘attractive’ is here
deﬁned to involve richer people this results in stratiﬁcation by income.
Thus in the status quo, there will be stratiﬁcation by income. Richer people will tend to
ﬂock together to ensure a higher level of educational expenditures for themselves, and to ensure
that they get the best peer groups available. Now suppose there is a school ﬁnance reform,
interpreted as a change in rules whereby educational expenditures are determined only at the
state level. That is, there is abolition of the local discretion over school spending. Motivation
(i) for stratiﬁcation by income is then no longer relevant - since the state equalizes expenditures
all around, richer and middle-income people will not be willing to pay extra rent for residences
in higher spending communities unless they could get something from the peer group eﬀect.
In other words, once a school ﬁnance reform is undertaken, the only reason that richer people
would be willing to pay higher rents to keep poor people out of their localities is if the peer
group eﬀect is particularly strong.
To sum, the prediction of this model is that initially there will be stratiﬁcation by income
across school districts. This should go down after a school ﬁnance reform which takes away
the local power to decide on school expenditures. But interestingly, the same stratiﬁcation may
persist if peer eﬀects are perceived to be strong.
Formally, a simple stylized model can be set up as follows. Let there be two communities, A
and B, indexed by superscript i. Utility of a household depends on educational achievement E
and spending on ‘all other goods’. E in turn is a function of per pupil school spending in the
community (Si), peer group quality in the community (Pi) and own income y. School spending
11is ﬁnanced by lump sum taxes Ti in community i.15 Let there be a continuum of households,
indexed by income y on the unit interval [0,1].
Utility of a household with income y who resides in community A, where the rent is RA and
the (lump-sum) tax is TA, is U[E(SA,PA,y),y −RA −TA)].16 Since I assume that both school
spending S and school tax T are the same for all persons within a community, they should be
equal, i.e. Ti = Si. I approximate the peer group eﬀect by the average income of residents in
a community, since by assumption the desirability of a peer group is monotonically related to
income. The rent R in each locality is a function of two things - ﬁrst, the innate cost of housing
in the locality, assumed to be the same in both A and B, and second, peer group quality in the
community Pi, which gets capitalized in the rent. Thus Ri = R(Pi) by assumption.17
Under these circumstances, there will be stratiﬁcation by income, in the sense that all persons
in community A will have incomes at least as high as those in community B.18 Let the person
with income y∗ be indiﬀerent between communities A and B. Then y∗ would be determined by
U[E(SA,PA,y∗),y∗ − RA − TA)] = U[E(SB,PB,y∗),y∗ − RB − TB)]...(1)
where Si = Ti for i = A,B and where SA and SB are determined by the preferences of the
15 I have assumed a lump-sum tax T for all residents of a given community. If people buy homes with values in
proportion to their income, then a proportional tax rate on income may be more appropriate. However, in many
districts there are zoning laws, so that people have to buy some minimum amount of property. In these cases a
head tax per household seems more relevant.
16 y − R
A − T
A, income net of rent payments and taxes for school spending, denotes the consumption of ‘all
other’ goods.
17 School spending S
i equals the lump sum tax T
i, so school spending does not get capitalized in the rent R
i.
18 In other words, if a person with income y
1 prefers community A to community B, everyone with an income
of y greater than y





1, both faced with the choice of residing either in community A or in community B. The y
2 person will
always be willing to pay more than the y
1 person for residing in A, since he will get a better education in A and
he is willing to pay more for a better education.
12median voter in the respective communities.19
A school ﬁnance reform can be approximated in this setup as an equalization of school spend-
ing (and hence, as a transfer of resources from community A to community B).20 Subsequent
to the reform, there would still be stratiﬁcation, but it would presumably be less pronounced,
in the sense that there would be an inﬂow of people from community A to community B.
To see this, note that the reform would result in a shift of the tax burden, assuming that it is
progressive in nature and is ﬁnanced by a relative increase in tax liabilities on the rich. In this
case, there will be a big mass of households around the middle of the income distribution who
will ﬁnd that their school spending has gone up without a corresponding increase in their tax
burdens. Some of them, who have been staying in the richer community A and paying higher
rents for higher school expenditures, would switch back to community B, where the schools
are now funded at much higher levels. It follows that there will be an outﬂow of people from
community A and into community B, though the fall in rents in A may moderate some of the
actual movement.
The important thing to note is that the changes depend crucially on the strength of the peer
group eﬀects. If peer eﬀects are a strong determinant of educational achievement, the movement
19 Assuming a uniform distribution e.g., the median voter in community A is the one with income halfway
between 1 and y
∗, i.e., (1 + y
∗)/2, and the median voter in B is one with income halfway between 0 and y
∗, i.e.
y
∗/2. Given this, the preferred values of S
A and S
B (as a function of y
∗) can be easily determined from utility
maximization. Once we plug in these values for S
A and S
B, the value of y
∗ can be easily determined from (1).
In the general case we can apply a variant of the ﬁxed point theorem to prove existence. Appropriate restrictions
on the functional forms should guarantee uniqueness of the solution.
20 For example, one scenario may be where spending in B is brought up to the level in A, though residents in
B only bear a fraction of the cost involved. In an extreme case, where all the additional money is raised from the
richer people, we will have S
B equaling S
A, T
B remaining the same and T
A increasing to cover the diﬀerence
S
A − S
B, assuming both communities are equal-sized.
13from higher spending to lower spending communities can be muted even if school expenditures
are equalized.
A disturbing feature of residential segregation in laissez faire in this case is that it can be
‘excessive’, that is, the extent of segregation is larger than is optimal from the societal point of
view. To see this, note that individual families sort if EPy > 0,21 since in that case it is the
richer family (with more income y) which has the most to gain from the move to the richer
neighborhood. However, if EPP < 0, then the marginal productivity of community quality
is decreasing (diminishing returns to peer group eﬀect at the community level), implying an
eﬃciency loss from stratiﬁcation.22
A last point to note is that since there will still be stratiﬁcation in the post-reform period
(because of peer eﬀects), it is not obvious that the average incomes and other socio-economic
indicators in the two communities will become more similar. Since it will be the relatively
poorer people in community A who now move to community B, the average incomes in both
communities will go up. The poorer community is better oﬀ from an absolute point of view, but
it is possible that the gap between the two communities now becomes even wider.23
Sorting by Demand for Education
The point of departure for models of sorting based on demand is that preferences over
21 Eij is the second derivative of E with respect to i and j.
22 This is a common feature of models of this type, e.g. in de Bartolome (1990), a Pareto improvement occurs
by shifting some more able families from the suburbs to the urban areas. The gain arises because in laissez-faire
the migrating families do not take account of the fact that all communities beneﬁt when a more able family
migrates in and suﬀers when it migrates out: this is an externality that is not being internalized by the migrant.
23 In the example of a uniform distribution, the diﬀerence in average incomes between communities A and B
remain the same even after some of the poorest people in A shift to B. (The diﬀerence is always 1/2.) But for
skewed distributions, as income distributions are in real life, there will generally be some diﬀerences.
14education are considered to be distributed independently of income.24 That is, people with the
same incomes can have very diﬀerent preferences for education. The models predict that just as
in models with income sorting, there will be stratiﬁcation across school districts, but that this
will be demand-based - some people with low incomes but higher demands for education would
be residing together with richer people with similar high demands for education. In other words,
some poor people would be willing to pay higher rents to ensure a higher level of educational
achievement for their kids.
The prediction of these models as to the consequences of a school ﬁnance reform is similar
to that of models with sorting by income. With expenditures equalized across communities, if
there were no peer eﬀects then there would not be any incentive for the poor people to continue
residing in the richer districts and paying higher rents. Housing prices in the higher-spending
districts would come down and though this may dilute the incentives for people to actually move
out of such districts, one should nevertheless see some such outﬂow. However, just as in models
with sorting based on incomes, if peer eﬀects are strong enough then there would continue to
be sorting based on demands and corresponding higher rents.
5 Results
Table 1 shows the changes in within-county dispersion of median household incomes and per
pupil expenditures in post-reform Michigan. I consider the 14 counties (out of 83) each of which
has at least 10 K-12 school districts. The results show that there has been a signiﬁcant dilution
24 See Loeb (2001) for a recent example of a model with spatial segregation based on demand for schooling.
15in disparities of school spending. The diﬀerence between the highest spending and the lowest
spending districts in each county has gone down not only in relative terms, but in absolute terms
as well. The eﬀect on dispersion of household incomes is comparatively muted. In most of the
cases there has been an improvement in relative terms, but the (absolute) gaps have widened in
all counties, sometimes signiﬁcantly.
5.1 Values of Housing Stock
I begin by classifying the Michigan K-12 school districts. 1993-94 was the last year before the
reform, and state aid after the reform was based on spending in this year. So I divide the
524 K-12 school districts in Michigan into 5 groups on the basis of 1993-94 spending. Group 1
consists of the lowest-spending 105 districts, and so on, Group 5 consists of the richest 105.25
Figure 1 shows the distributions of per pupil housing stock in the diﬀerent groups of districts
in 1994, the last year before the reform, and in 2001, the last year in my analysis. The top
panel shows the distributions in the lowest spending (Group 1) and highest spending (Group 5)
districts, the bottom panel is for the lowest spending districts vis-a-vis the upper middle group
(Group 4).26 There has been a modest to large increase in housing stock in the lowest spending
districts in the post-reform period, both in absolute and relative terms.
I next compare the trends in values of housing stock in these diﬀerent groups of districts,
25 This is the same classiﬁcation used in Roy (2004). See Table 4 in that paper for some summary statistics on
these groups of districts.
26 These show the kernel smoothed plots of general fund expenditures in the two groups of districts. All ﬁgures
have been weighted by district enrollment.
16pre and post-reform. I run the following ﬁxed eﬀects (FE) regression on data from 1990 to 2001
Hsgt = α + αs + β3 ∗ t +
X
g =3
βg ∗ (Dg ∗ t) + γ3 ∗ (reform) +
X
g =3
γg ∗ (Dg ∗ reform)
+θ3 ∗ (reform ∗ t) +
X
g =3
θg ∗ (Dg ∗ reform ∗ t) + δ ∗ Xsgt + εsgt (2)
Hsgt is the value of per pupil housing stock (state equalized valuation or SEV) of district s in
group g in year t. αs is the district ﬁxed eﬀect while Xsgt are the time-varying characteristics
(controls).27 Dg’s are the dummy variables for the respective groups. Group 3, comprising of
the middle group of districts, is the omitted category. ‘Reform’ is a binary variable, taking the
value 0 pre-reform and 1 afterwards. t is a time-trend, equal to 0 in 1994, 1 in 1995 and so on. In
this speciﬁcation, θg’s give the diﬀerences in post-reform trends over and above the diﬀerences in
βg’s, the pre-reform trends - they can thus be interpreted as a sort of a diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences
estimate for trends.28
The results are in Table 3. Prior to the reform, there was a very signiﬁcant gap between
the highest and the lowest spending districts. The value of housing stock in Group 5 districts
was increasing at a much faster rate than districts in Groups 1 and 2.29 In fact, there was a
clear hierarchy in pre-reform trends - Group 1 districts were lagging behind Group 2 districts,
who in turn were lagging behind Group 3 districts, and so on. Post-reform, however, the gap
is considerably reduced. Though most of the trend estimates (θ1 and θ2) are not signiﬁcant,
27 Since free lunch data for 1990 and 1991 are either not available or not reliable, I have only included enrollment
and ethnic composition in Xsgt. Running the regression on a sub-sample when data on both controls are available
does not change the qualitative results.
28 I do not have data on individual house prices before and after the reform. The Michigan Department of
Education provides data on the value of total housing stock in the districts. While an analysis with exact house
prices has its advantages, it is possible that the value of housing stock is a better indicator of demand for housing,
particularly if supplies of new houses are quite elastic.
29 Recall that the groups are arranged in ascending order of pre-reform spending - Group 1 consists of the
lowest spending 105 districts, while Group 5 consists of the highest spending 105.
17they are always positive and sometimes large. There is also a large relative increase (intercept
shift) in the value of the housing stock in these poorest districts following the reform. Note that
in all the speciﬁcations the post-reform coeﬃcients for both intercepts and trends maintain a
hierarchy (θ1 > θ2 > 0 > θ3 > θ4, similarly for the γg’s).
These results on housing stock mirror those for revenues and expenditures.30 The gap in
per pupil spending between the richest and the poorest districts had been increasing in the
years before the program. There was a clear hierarchy here too - the richer a group, the higher
its growth rate. Post-reform, this completely reversed itself. Since much of the increases in
spending in the lowest-spending districts were coming from the state, this should increase the
‘desirability’ of these communities. That is, some people with high preferences for schooling
who earlier had been living in richer districts should now move back - one beneﬁt of living in
high property-value districts is no longer operative.
One important diﬀerence between the two sets of results is that for school spending, the
lowest-spending districts witness higher rates of growth in spending, in an absolute sense, in
the post-reform period. For housing stock, the opposite is the case. Districts in the highest
spending communities (Groups 4 and 5) continue to outpace districts in Groups 1 and 2 in the
post-reform period, though at much reduced rates than before. One reason for this is most
possibly the staggered nature of the program in Michigan. As mentioned earlier, individual
districts are constrained in the amounts of annual increases to their spending, but parents can
move from one district to a higher-spending one, which will continue to have higher levels of
30 See Roy (2004, Table 5) for results obtained by running equation (2) on district revenues and expenditures.
18spending because of the ‘hold-harmless’ clause in the law. Another reason for the continued
high demand for housing in the richer districts may be the strength of the peer eﬀects. If these
eﬀects are strong, then even a complete equalization of school resources may not be enough to
prevent socio-economic segregation across school districts.
Figure 2 shows the year-to-year changes in housing stocks across the diﬀerent groups of
districts. I run a ﬁxed eﬀects regression similar to equation (2) but with unrestricted year
eﬀects, and plot the values of the estimated coeﬃcients.31 There has been some convergence
in the immediate post-reform period between the lowest spending districts and others, though
towards the end of the decade the highest spending districts seem to break away from the rest.
Table 4 provides additional evidence on the continued high demand for housing in the highest-
spending districts in the post-reform period. I run the following ﬁxed-eﬀects regression, sepa-
rately for total housing stock, homestead housing stock and non-homestead housing stock for
the period 1995 to 2001.32
Hsgt = α + αs + β3 ∗ t +
X
g =3
βg ∗ (Dg ∗ t) + δ ∗ Xsgt + εsgt (3)
The results show that in the post-reform period the housing stock, for both homestead and
non-homestead, has been increasing in value in each group of districts. For the lowest spending
districts in Groups 1 and 2, the diﬀerences with Group 3 are not large, except for homestead
housing where the former seems to be somewhat lagging behind. The more interesting ﬁnding
31 As earlier Group 3, the middle group of districts, is the omitted category. So the plotted values are the
deviations from Group 3 year eﬀects.
32 All three variables are in per pupil terms. Total housing stock is the sum of homestead and non-homestead
housing stock. As mentioned in Section 3, values of homestead housing stock and non-homestead housing stock
are not available for the pre-reform period when these were taxed at a uniform rate.
19is that even after the reform, property values are growing at the fastest rates in the highest
spending school districts, both for homestead and non-homestead properties.
5.2 Eﬀect on Socioeconomic Segregation
First, I use the decennial census data to document changes in socioeconomic segregation between
1990 and 2000, which straddle 1995, the ﬁrst year of the reform. Next I show whether diﬀerent
Michigan school districts witnessed diﬀerent rates of inﬂows of population since 1995. In each
of the regressions reported below Group 3, the middle quintile of districts in the pre-reform
spending scale, is the omitted category.
5.2.1 Changes between the 1990 and 2000 Censuses
The theoretical discussion in section 4 suggests that following a school ﬁnance reform, when
resources are equalized across diﬀerent groups of districts, the poorer districts should be expected
to witness inﬂows of population from their higher-spending counterparts. However, the extent
of this inﬂow might be diluted by decreases in property values in the latter and increases in the
former.
I begin my analysis by looking at changes in population and housing variables. Table 5(a)
documents the changes in four important variables across diﬀerent Michigan districts - number
of households and total housing units, proportion of occupied housing units and owner-occupied
units.33 As far as the ﬁrst two are concerned, there is no evidence of a signiﬁcant inﬂux of
33 All the regressions reported in this section are of the same form as equation (3), with t=0 for 1990 and t=1
for 2000.
20population in the lowest spending districts. In fact, districts in Groups 1 and 2 seem to lag
behind all the other groups. However, the proportion of housing units that is occupied went up
by the largest amounts in the Group 1 districts, followed by those in Group 2. The same is true
for the proportion of occupied units that are owned - possibly an indicator of the conﬁdence of
people in their property’s price in the near future.34
Table 5(b) documents the changes in four income-related variables - median household income
in the district, proportion of people with public assistance (PA) income, and the proportions
of persons and children below the poverty level. In each of these variables, there has been a
large overall improvement between the two censuses. For median household income, the trends
in the diﬀerent groups do not seem to be any diﬀerent from each other. For all the other three
variables however, Group 1 districts seem to have signiﬁcantly improved over the other groups.
In fact, there seems to be a clear hierarchy - the proportion of households under welfare, and
the proportions of persons and children under poverty declined at the fastest rates in Group 1
districts, followed by Group 2, and so on.35
Table 5(c) presents results on changes in the racial composition of school districts and in
the civilian unemployment rate. The results for unemployment rate mirror those for the income
variables in Table 5(b) - the largest declines were in the lowest spending districts (Group 1),
34 One caveat should be mentioned at this point. I cannot strictly disaggregate the changes between 1990 and
2000 into that which happened prior to the reform and that which was post-reform. But in the appendix I control
for pre-existing trends using data from the 1980 census, the results are qualitatively similar.
35 Prior to the reform, Group 1 and Group 2 districts lagged behind others in these income variables. So some
of the improvement may be due to regression to the mean. However, as shown in the appendix, between 1980
and 1990 the lowest spending districts mostly performed worse than the others, even though they were already
lagging behind in 1980 (Table A-1). So most of the eﬀects, particularly in Group 1 districts, should be a result of
the school ﬁnance reform.
21followed by those in Group 2, and so on. The results on racial composition are slightly diﬀerent.
Overall, the proportion of whites declined in Michigan, while those of the blacks and Hispanics
increased, the latter at a faster rate. However, the districts were not equally aﬀected by the
changes. Group 1 districts, which already were overwhelmingly white, actually witnessed a
slight decline in the black population. The Hispanic population there increased in line with
most other groups. Districts in the highest spending quintiles (Groups 4 and 5), which already
had the largest presence of blacks and Hispanics in 1990, witnessed the largest increases in these
minority populations.
Table 5(d) presents results on variables relating to educational attainment. I include the
four measures available from census data - the proportion of adults with less than 12th grade
schooling, the proportion who are high school graduates, the proportion with some college
education (though not a bachelor’s degree), and the proportion with at least a bachelor’s degree.
The results show that at the lower end of the spectrum - for the proportion of adults who are
high school dropouts, e.g. - it is the lowest spending districts in Group 1 who improved at the
fastest rate. The proportion of adults with some college education also increased at the fastest
rate in Group 1 districts.36 However, as far as the proportion of college graduates are concerned,
it is the richest districts which had the most improvement to show. I also deﬁned a new variable,
by adding up the populations with some college education and with a bachelor’s degree. This
would give the proportion of adults who have had at least some college education. I ﬁnd that
for this variable too, it is the lowest spending districts in Groups 1 and 2 which show the most
36 Like for income variables (see fn. 35), districts in Groups 1 and 2 lagged behind others in educational
attainment too. So regression to the mean may explain part of the results. However, accounting for pre-existing
trends from the 1980 census does not change the results, see Table A-3.
22improvement, while districts in the top quintiles lag behind.
5.2.2 Results relating to Residence in 1995
My ﬁnal results relate to residence of the current (2000) population in 1995. The 2000 census
asked all residents of a school district about their residence in 1995, ﬁve years earlier. It is
possible to construct from this response a measure of the inﬂows of population into each district
between 1995 and 2000. Note that one of the predictions of the theoretical model is that a
school ﬁnance reform would lead to more people ﬂocking to the lowest spending districts, the
recipients of large amounts of state aid following the program. Since 1995 was the ﬁrst year
of the program, one would expect to see most of the increases in Proposal A-induced mobility
beginning this year.
Table 6 shows the results. The dependent variable in the ﬁrst three columns concerns the
proportion of current residents of a school district who were living in a diﬀerent house in 1995.
This includes all persons who were living in a diﬀerent house - whether it is the same school
district or not,37 the same county or not, the same state or not, the U.S. or abroad or at sea. If
peer eﬀects were not perceived to be important, one would expect to ﬁnd a higher value of this
variable in the lower spending districts, since a higher fraction of their current residents would
come from outside of the districts.38 But this does not seem to be the case. The proportion
of current school district population coming in after 1995 seems to be the highest in Group 4
37 Unfortunately, this includes residing in a diﬀerent house within the same school district. It is not possible
to ﬁlter out from the reported data the proportions living in the same house and in a diﬀerent house within the
same school district in 1995.
38 Recall the discussion in Section 4.
23districts, followed by Group 5, and lowest in the lowest spending districts in Group 1 and Group
2.
One caveat with this variable is that this includes all persons who were living in a diﬀerent
house. It is conceivable that most of the inﬂow of population to the lowest spending districts
in the aftermath of the reform would be a result of relocations within the state. So in the last
three columns of Table 6 I report the results using a diﬀerent measure - viz., I use only that
proportion of current residents of a district who were living in a diﬀerent house in 1995, but
within Michigan. The results are slightly diﬀerent. Now there is no evidence of any signiﬁcantly
diﬀerent inﬂows of populations in any group except Group 4.
6 Conclusion
There is growing concern among educators and policy makers that district and neighborhood
based school systems generate incentives that lead to residential income segregation, and there is
mounting evidence that such segregation could perpetuate income inequality (Benabou, 1996a,
1996b). In this paper I study the Michigan school ﬁnance reform of 1994, called Proposal A, to
analyze the impact a change in school ﬁnancing institutions can have on socioeconomic segre-
gation. Proposal A ended local discretion over school spending and resulted in a comprehensive
equalization of per pupil expenditures in the state. Using panel data on all Michigan K-12
districts from 1990 to 2001 and data from the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses, which straddle
1994, I investigate whether the reform had any signiﬁcant eﬀects on housing stock, property
values and inter-district movements of households, thereby changing the extent of residential
24sorting in the state.
The ﬁrst results on trends in the value of housing stock point to a positive eﬀect of the
school ﬁnance reform on property values in the lowest spending districts. At the same time,
the results point to a sustained high demand for residence in the highest spending communities.
When I use census data, there seem to have been signiﬁcant relative improvements, at least in
the poorest districts, in several indicators. This is particularly true for the income and employ-
ment variables, and holds good even when I control for pre-existing trends using the 1980 census.
Overall, it seems reasonable to conclude that Proposal A has been responsible for some increases
in housing stock and property values in the lowest spending districts, and for improvements in
several socioeconomic indicators. However, the changes are still relatively modest, and in line
with Nechyba’s (2003) simulation results that suggest state ﬁnancing leads to a slight decline in
the extent of spatial segregation compared to local ﬁnancing. The continued ‘desirability’ of the
highest spending districts, which is reﬂected in the census regressions too, may stem partly from
the staggered nature of the reform, though most of it is possibly a reﬂection of the strength of
local peer eﬀects (neighborhood ‘social capital’).
Appendix
I provide evidence that the results in Section 5.2.1, which use data from the 1990 and 2000
censuses, are robust to controlling for pre-existing trends. In particular, I show that the results
are qualitatively similar when I use data from the 1980 census to control for pre-program trends
that might otherwise confound the estimates.
25I run the following regression on data from the 1980, 1990 and 2000 censuses.
Ysgt = α + αs + β3 ∗ t +
X
g =3
βg ∗ (Dg ∗ t) + θ3 ∗ (reform ∗ t) +
X
g =3
θg ∗ (Dg ∗ reform ∗ t)
+εsgt (A − 1)
Ysgt is the value of the dependent variable in district s in group g in census year t. αs is
the district ﬁxed eﬀect. t takes the values -1, 0, and 1 for 1980, 1990 and 2000 census years
respectively. Reform is a binary variable, taking the value of 1 for census year 2000 and 0
otherwise. In this speciﬁcation βg’ s measure the diﬀerential rates of change in diﬀerent groups
in the pre-reform period (between 1980 and 1990 censuses), while θg’ s are the additional eﬀects
in the post-program period (between 1990 and 2000 censuses) and can be interpreted as a sort
of diﬀerence-in-diﬀerences estimate, just like in equation (2). As always, Group 3, the middle
group of districts, is the omitted category in the regressions which are estimated by ﬁxed eﬀects
(FE).
The ﬁrst results are on population and housing variables in Table A-1. For number of
households and total housing units, the lowest spending districts in Groups 1 and 2 are seen to
lag behind, both in the pre and the post-reform periods, but the diﬀerences are never statistically
signiﬁcant. For occupied housing units and the proportion of occupied units that are owner-
occupied, however, there were considerable relative increases in the lowest spending districts in
the 1990-2000 period. Note that the post-program results are qualitatively in line with those in
Table 5(a).
Table A-2 shows results on income and employment variables. The general picture is that
26between 1980 and 1990 districts in Group 1 were lagging behind others, often signiﬁcantly. But
they have outperformed others in the 1990-2000 period, improving at a rate signiﬁcantly higher
than the common trends, which are themselves positive and large.39 Again, the results are
qualitatively similar to those in Tables 5(b) and 5(c).
Finally, Table A-3 shows the results on racial composition and educational attainment. For
the former, just like in Table 5(c), Group 1 districts witness slight increases in the proportion
of whites and slight declines in the proportion of blacks, but none of the changes are signiﬁcant.
As far as educational attainment of adults over the age of 25 is concerned, there are some im-
provements at the lower end of the distribution (proportion of high school dropouts declining)
but not much otherwise. Like in Table 5(d), the proportion of people with a baccalaureate or
more increased at the fastest rate in the highest spending districts (Group 5) in both 1980-1990
and 1990-2000 periods, possibly reﬂecting the desirability of these districts as residences.
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30Table 1: Changes in Within-County Inequality in Median Household Incomes and Per Pupil Expenditures
(Michigan, 1989-90 to 1999-00)
County No. of Districts Range of District Percentage Range of District Percentage
in the County Median Incomes in County Diﬀerence Per Pupil Exp. in County Diﬀerence
1989 1999 1989 1999 1989 1999 1989 1999
Berrien 14 20,625 26,350 223 203 3369 2549 205 143
Calhoun 10 15,262 16,655 172 154 1800 1782 154 130
Genesee 21 33,159 49,038 293 288 2156 4092 165 172
Ingham 12 22,695 33,765 187 212 2188 2177 164 134
Jackson 12 11,069 18,529 144 150 1155 2186 137 138
Kent 19 34,034 47,995 227 229 2010 2122 162 134
Lenawee 12 17,715 19,281 185 151 931 1029 129 117
Macomb 21 26,934 33,850 233 199 3421 3207 202 153
Muskegon 12 23,609 33,308 272 254 1986 2768 162 146
Oakland 28 63,290 78,118 346 317 5108 5281 249 184
Saginaw 13 21,045 28,916 213 205 1862 4344 160 181
Van Buren 11 26,686 32,899 283 232 1754 5491 160 198
Washtenaw 10 25,706 44,801 196 226 2693 2866 173 145
Wayne 34 52,814 70,725 638 499 2869 3602 179 162
There are 83 counties in Michigan. 14 of them have at least 10 K-12 school districts, and are included in this table. For each such
county in each census year, I ﬁrst ﬁnd the districts with the highest and the lowest values of median household income. The range
of income reported above is the absolute diﬀerence between these two values. The columns marked Percentage Diﬀerence show the
corresponding percentage diﬀerences - incomes in the richest district as percentages of those in the poorest. For example in 1989, of
the 14 school districts in Berrien county, Lakeshore School District, the richest district, had a median income of $37,367 while Benton
Harbor Area Schools, the poorest, had a median income of only $16,742, a diﬀerence of $20,625 (223%). The same procedure is followed
to calculate the corresponding ﬁgures for per pupil expenditures.
Source: Author’s calculations from the 1990 and 2000 decennial censuses, and Bulletin 1014’s published by the Michigan Department
of Education.Table 2: Increases in Foundation Allowances, post-reform Michigan
(Selected districts at diﬀerent points of pre-reform spending distribution)
District 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999 2000 2001
Standish Sterling 3738 4200 4506 4816 5124 5170 5700 6000
Delton-Kellogg 4501 4740 4988 5235 5462 5462 5700 6000
Kearsley Community 5008 5227 5380 5535 5689 5689 5927 6227
Carman-Ainsworth 6002 6181 6334 6489 6643 6643 6881 7182
Warren Woods 7069 7239 7392 7547 7701 7701 7824 7997
Grant Township 10,681 10,841 10,994 11,149 11,303 11,303 11,484 11,737
FA in Grant Town/
FA in Standish-Sterling 2.86 2.58 2.44 2.31 2.21 2.19 2.01 1.96
Source: Michigan Department of Education. The last row shows the foundation allowances in Grant Town-
ship as a proportion of those in Standish-Sterling.Table 3: Pre and Post-reform Trends in Value of Per Pupil Housing Stock (SEV), Michigan
(FE regressions, 1990-2001)
Trend (t) 4892∗∗ 5259∗∗ 5327∗∗
(310) (366) (372)
Group 1 * t -952∗ -902∗ -942∗
(414) (457) (460)
Group 2 * t -225 -368 -437
(438) (479) (492)
Group 4 * t 2773∗∗ 353 1835∗∗
(578) (1574) (603)
Group 5 * t 7978∗∗ 2979∗∗ 3648∗∗
(1494) (785) (721)
Reform -4644∗∗ -5184∗∗ -5170∗∗
(866) (1113) (1110)
Group 1 * reform 894 1856 1935
(1191) (1387) (1373)
Group 2 * reform 540 422 674
(1188) (1414) (1439)
Group 4 * reform -709 -3618 -3360+
(1528) (2940) (1864)
Group 5 * reform -11456∗∗ -8924∗∗ -9207∗∗
(3279) (2083) (2138)
Reform * t 1129∗∗ 1015∗ 1028∗
(365) (448) (454)
Group 1 * reform * t 959∗ 433 400
(491) (547) (550)
Group 2 * reform * t 147 32 82
(515) (572) (584)
Group 4 * reform * t -1032 -325 -103
(665) (1749) (742)
Group 5 * reform * t -2606+ -1627+ -1912∗
(1629) (904) (838)
Observations 6269 6269 6209
R-squared 0.96 0.97 0.98
Weighted N Y Y
Exclude 5 Biggest Districts N N Y
Notes: The dependent variable is the per pupil housing value in the district (state equalized valuation). Group
3, the middle group of districts, is the omitted category. All regressions control for race and enrollment, not
reported for brevity. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.Table 4: Post-reform Trends in Value of Housing Stock, Michigan
(FE Regressions, 1994-2001)
Total Homestead Non-Homestead
Housing Stock Housing Stock Housing Stock
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9)
Trend (t) 5169∗∗ 5418∗∗ 5466∗∗ 4014∗∗ 4184∗∗ 4137∗∗ 1801∗∗ 2006∗∗ 2064∗∗
(149) (201) (203) (91) (114) (115) (110) (145) (142)
Group 1 * t 158 -210 -262 -258∗ -387∗∗ -318∗ 324∗ -10 -116
(199) (231) (232) (112) (131) (134) (158) (164) (158)
Group 2 * t 58 -199 -174 -258∗ -240 -236 260+ -54 -58
(198) (243) (246) (125) (161) (162) (150) (183) (177)
Group 4 * t 1257∗∗ -557 1074∗∗ 536∗∗ -203 600∗∗ 877∗∗ 219 730∗∗
(240) (640) (316) (141) (485) (180) (185) (310) (267)
Group 5 * t 3776∗∗ 370 650+ 1378∗∗ 779∗∗ 610∗ 3129∗∗ 324 677∗∗
(538) (401) (386) (229) (274) (257) (497) (245) (232)
R-squared 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98
Observations 4173 4173 4133 3666 3666 3631 3666 3666 3631
Districts 524 524 519 524 524 519 524 524 519
Weighted N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Exclude 5 Big Districts N N Y N N Y N N Y
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the value of the total housing stock in the district (state
equalized valuation). The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the value of the homestead housing stock, while in
columns (7)-(9) it is the value of the non-homestead housing stock. All three dependent variables are in per pupil terms.
Group 3, the middle quintile of districts in the pre-reform spending distributon, is the omitted category. The ﬁve biggest
districts are Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing (all in Group 4), Flint and Utica (both in Group 5). The regressions in
columns (2)-(3), (5)-(6) and (8)-(9) are weighted by the enrollment of the district in 1990. All regressions control for
ethnic composition and size of the districts. For brevity I do not report the other coeﬃcients. +, ∗, ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance
at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively. Note that Group 1 is the lowest spending quintile, and so on, Group 5 is
the highest spending quintile.Table 5a: Changes in Selected Demographic and Economic Characteristics, Michigan School Districts
(Population and Housing Variables, 1990 and 2000 Censuses, FE Regressions)
Number of Total Housing Occupied Housing Proportion of
Households Units Units Owner-occupied Units
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Year 2000 Dummy 645∗∗ 1181∗∗ 1181∗∗ 702∗∗ 1294∗∗ 1294∗∗ 0.75∗ 0.16 0.16 2.21∗∗ 1.95∗∗ 1.95∗∗
(Yr 2000) (93) (274) (274) (99) (269) (269) (0.35) (0.30) (0.30) (0.23) (0.28) (0.28)
Group 1 * Yr 2000 -189+ -596+ -596+ -245∗ -682∗ -682∗ 1.93∗∗ 1.39∗ 1.39∗ 0.51 1.20∗ 1.20∗
(110) (299) (299) (114) (296) (296) (0.57) (0.62) (0.62) (0.37) (0.55) (0.55)
Group 2 * Yr 2000 -85 -375 -375 -114 -512 -512 0.57 1.32+ 1.32∗ 0.59 0.79 0.79
(123) (311) (311) (165) (330) (330) (0.62) (0.77) (0.77) (0.38) (0.55) (0.55)
Group 4 * Yr 2000 196 -11434 864 257 -10640 927 -0.10 -0.71+ -0.33 -0.23 -0.20 -0.20
(430) (8575) (557) (415) (8092) (548) (0.47) (0.40) (0.36) (0.37) (0.36) (0.44)
Group 5 * Yr 2000 375 1222 976+ 328 1130 805 0.60 0.16 0.37 -0.04 -0.51 -0.50
(250) (900) (602) (244) (831) (570) (0.51) (0.43) (0.37) (0.37) (0.38) (0.40)
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98
Observations 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036
Districts 523 523 518 523 523 518 523 523 518 523 523 518
Weighted N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Exclude 5 Biggest Districts N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Group 3, the middle quintile of districts in the pre-reform spending distributon, is the omitted category. The ﬁve biggest districts are Detroit, Grand Rapids,
Lansing (all in Group 4), Flint and Utica (both in Group 5). The regressions in columns (2)-(3), (5)-(6), (8)-(9) and (11)-(12) are weighted by the number of
persons in the district in 1990. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 5b: Changes in Selected Demographic and Economic Characteristics, Michigan School Districts
(Income Variables, 1990 and 2000 Censuses, FE Regressions)
Median Household Households with Persons Below Children Below
Income PA Income Poverty Poverty
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Year 2000 Dummy 14159∗∗ 13946∗∗ 13946∗∗ -5.49∗∗ -5.05∗∗ -5.05∗∗ -3.08∗∗ -2.46∗∗ -2.46∗∗ -4.25∗∗ -3.54∗∗ -3.54∗∗
(Yr 2000) (362) (426) (427) (0.27) (0.32) (0.32) (0.30) (0.31) (0.31) (0.50) (0.48) (0.48)
Group 1 * Yr 2000 -282 -47 -47 -0.85∗ -1.02∗ -1.02∗ -1.24∗∗ -1.17∗∗ -1.17∗∗ -1.14 -0.96 -0.96
(518) (902) (902) (0.37) (0.42) (0.42) (0.42) (0.45) (0.45) (0.72) (0.74) (0.74)
Group 2 * Yr 2000 -105 280 280 0.23 0.20 20 0.13 -0.03 -0.03 0.89 0.48 0.48
(491) (670) (671) (0.35) (0.55) (0.55) (0.43) (0.47) (0.47) (0.67) (0.66) (0.66)
Group 4 * Yr 2000 517 -1288 169 1.00∗∗ -2.95 0.29 1.38∗∗ -0.28 1.14∗∗ 1.73∗∗ -1.55 0.98
(554) (871) (851) (0.39) (2.13) (0.66) (0.40) (1.07) (0.42) (0.62) (1.69) (0.69)
Group 5 * Yr 2000 341 559 765 0.95∗ 1.51∗ 1.93∗∗ 1.53∗∗ 2.20∗∗ 2.44∗∗ 2.20∗∗ 3.02∗∗ 3.24∗∗
(661) (902) (889) (0.48) (0.67) (0.46) (0.43) (0.47) (0.43) (0.63) (0.65) (0.61)
R-squared 0.97 0.97 0.97 0.88 0.91 0.88 0.94 0.98 0.97 0.93 0.97 0.96
Observations 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036
Districts 523 523 518 523 523 518 523 523 518 523 523 518
Weighted N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Exclude 5 Biggest Districts N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Group 3, the middle quintile of districts in the pre-reform spending distributon, is the omitted category. The ﬁve biggest districts are Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing
(all in Group 4), Flint and Utica (both in Group 5). The regressions in columns (2)-(3), (5)-(6), (8)-(9) and (11)-(12) are weighted by the number of persons in the
district in 1990. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 5c: Changes in Selected Demographic and Economic Characteristics, Michigan School Districts
(Demograhic and Employment Variables, 1990 and 2000 Censuses, FE Regressions)
Proportion of Proportion of Proportion of Civilian
Non-Hispanic White Non-Hispanic Black Hispanics Unemployment Rate
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Year 2000 Dummy -2.57∗∗ -3.02∗∗ -3.02∗∗ 0.32∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.46∗∗ 0.90∗∗ 0.98∗∗ 0.98∗∗ -2.82∗∗ -2.40∗∗ -2.40∗∗
(Yr 2000) (0.30) (0.38) (0.38) (0.14) (0.12) (0.12) (0.13) (0.12) (0.12) (0.21) (0.21) (0.21)
Group 1 * Yr 2000 0.37 1.07∗ 1.07∗ -0.35 -0.68∗ -0.68∗ 0.07 0.02 0.02 -0.19 -0.58 -0.58
(0.40) (0.48) (0.48) (0.25) (0.32) (0.32) (0.22) (0.19) (0.19) (0.35) (0.39) (0.39)
Group 2 * Yr 2000 0.14 0.42 0.42 -0.00 0.06 0.06 -0.05 -0.14 -0.14 0.27 0.09 0.09
(0.38) (0.51) (0.51) (0.19) (0.25) (0.25) (0.20) (0.21) (0.21) (0.32) (0.39) (0.39)
Group 4 * Yr 2000 -1.50∗∗ -4.58∗∗ -2.51∗∗ 0.75∗∗ 2.60∗∗ 1.26∗∗ 0.20 1.00∗ 0.43+ 0.95∗∗ -0.63 0.69+
(0.49) (1.05) (0.64) (0.25) (0.95) (0.28) (0.25) (0.39) (0.25) (0.28) (1.03) (0.37)
Group 5 * Yr 2000 -2.72∗∗ -3.94∗∗ -3.97∗∗ 1.44∗∗ 2.16∗∗ 2.16∗∗ 0.01 -0.33∗ -0.28+ 1.07∗∗ 0.78∗ 0.97∗∗
(0.54) (0.82) (0.87) (0.43) (0.69) (0.75) (0.22) (0.14) (0.14) (0.40) (0.33) (0.29)
R-squared 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.98 0.99 0.98 0.88 0.91 0.92 0.88 0.94 0.90
Observations 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036
Districts 523 523 518 523 523 518 523 523 518 523 523 518
Weighted N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Exclude 5 Biggest Districts N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Group 3, the middle quintile of districts in the pre-reform spending distributon, is the omitted category. The ﬁve biggest districts are Detroit, Grand Rapids,
Lansing (all in Group 4), Flint and Utica (both in Group 5). The regressions in columns (2)-(3), (5)-(6), (8)-(9) and (11)-(12) are weighted by the number of
persons in the district in 1990. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 5d: Changes in Selected Demographic and Economic Characteristics, Michigan School Districts
(Variables relating to Educational Attainment, 1990 and 2000 Censuses, FE Regressions)
Less than High School Some College Bachelor’s Degree
12th grade Graduates Education or More
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
Year 2000 Dummy -6.64∗∗ -5.99∗∗ -5.99∗∗ -0.89∗∗ -0.98∗ -0.98∗ 3.69∗∗ 2.85∗∗ 2.85∗∗ 3.88∗∗ 4.14∗∗ 4.14∗∗
(Yr 2000) (0.26) (0.28) (0.28) (0.30) (0.41) (0.41) (0.33) (0.33) (0.33) (0.25) (0.32) (0.32)
Group 1 * Yr 2000 -0.99∗∗ -1.42∗∗ -1.42∗∗ 0.67 0.59 0.59 0.95∗ 1.22∗ 1.22∗ -0.72∗ -0.45 -0.45
(0.37) (0.41) (0.41) (0.44) (0.60) (0.60) (0.42) (0.54) (0.54) (0.34) (0.52) (0.52)
Group 2 * Yr 2000 -0.33 -0.40 -0.40 0.11 -0.12 -0.12 0.34 0.25 0.25 -0.11 0.34 0.34
(0.39) (0.40) (0.40) (0.44) (0.57) (0.57) (0.54) (0.67) (0.67) (0.37) (0.44) (0.44)
Group 4 * Yr 2000 0.82∗ 0.80 1.04∗∗ -0.54 0.80 -0.28 -1.54∗∗ -1.79∗ -2.12∗∗ 1.27∗∗ 0.20 1.47∗∗
(0.40) (0.61) (0.39) (0.45) (0.85) (0.60) (0.51) (0.73) (0.71) (0.40) (0.86) (0.57)
Group 5 * Yr 2000 0.83+ 2.27∗∗ 2.29∗∗ -0.78 -0.64 -0.77 -2.27∗∗ -4.22∗∗ -4.36∗∗ 2.18∗∗ 2.66∗∗ 2.86∗∗
(0.46) (0.43) (0.45) (0.47) (0.51) (0.51) (0.63) (0.92) (0.98) (0.53) (0.79) (0.82)
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.99 0.95 0.96 0.97 0.85 0.77 0.76 0.97 0.98 0.98
Observations 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036 1046 1046 1036
Districts 523 523 518 523 523 518 523 523 518 523 523 518
Weighted N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y N Y Y
Exclude 5 Biggest Districts N N Y N N Y N N Y N N Y
Group 3, the middle quintile of districts in the pre-reform spending distributon, is the omitted category. The ﬁve biggest districts are Detroit, Grand Rapids,
Lansing (all in Group 4), Flint and Utica (both in Group 5). The regressions in columns (2)-(3), (5)-(6), (8)-(9) and (11)-(12) are weighted by the number of
persons in the district in 1990. Robust standard errors are in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels.Table 6: Proportion of 2000 Population Living in a Diﬀerent House in 1995, Michigan School Districts
All Areas, including other Within-State only
U.S. states and abroad (Michigan resident in 1995)
(1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
Constant 38.79∗∗ 40.83∗∗ 40.83∗∗ 33.76∗∗ 35.27∗∗ 35.27∗∗
(0.55) (0.71) (0.71) (0.50) (0.64) (0.64)
Group 1 -0.42 -1.45 -1.45 -0.75 -1.27 -1.27
(0.71) (0.86) (0.86) (0.67) (0.76) (0.76)
Group 2 -0.30 -0.89 -0.89 -1.14 -1.46 -1.46
(0.81) (0.96) (0.96) (0.74) (0.96) (0.96)
Group 4 2.52∗∗ 3.03+ 3.98∗∗ 1.89∗ 2.27+ 3.26∗∗
(0.95) (1.57) (1.13) (0.82) (1.16) (0.93)
Group 5 1.84∗ 1.85 1.55 -0.44 -0.19 -0.84
(0.89) (1.25) (1.35) (0.79) (0.98) (0.93)
Observations 523 523 518 523 523 518
R-squared 0.04 0.07 0.08 0.03 0.08 0.11
Weighted N Y Y N Y Y
Exclude 5 Biggest Districts N N Y N N Y
Notes: The dependent variable in columns (1)-(3) is the proportion of 2000 population of the district that
was living in a diﬀerent house in 1995. The dependent variable in columns (4)-(6) is the proportion of 2000
population of the district that was living in a diﬀerent house, but within Michigan, in 1995. The results
are from OLS regressions of the dependent variable on a constant and four group dummies. Group 3, the
middle quintile of districts in the pre-reform spending distributon, is the omitted category. The ﬁve biggest
districts are Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing (all in Group 4), Flint and Utica (both in Group 5). Robust
standard errors are in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗ denotes signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels respectively.
Source: Author’s calculations from the 2000 decennial census.Table A-1: Changes in Selected Demographic and Economic Characteristics, Michigan School Districts
(1980, 1990 and 2000 Censuses, FE Regressions)
Number of Total Housing Proportion of Proportion of
Households Units Occupied Units Owner-occupied Units
Trend (t) 771∗∗ 778∗∗ -2.10∗∗ -1.47∗∗
(273) (282) (0.43) (0.26)
Group 1 * t -250 -229 -5.05∗∗ -0.43
(291) (299) (1.11) (0.48)
Group 2 * t -178 -229 -1.93∗ -0.42
(308) (326) (0.79) (0.48)
Group 4 * t -20908 -21450 1.04∗ -1.68∗
(15570) (15776) (0.48) (0.66)
Group 5 * t 1250 1629∗ 0.49 -1.25∗
(889) (852) (0.51) (0.60)
Reform * t 352 461 2.18∗∗ 3.43∗∗
(405) (414) (0.67) (0.44)
Group 1 * reform * t -326 -425 6.25∗∗ 1.70∗
(440) (450) (1.67) (0.87)
Group 2 * reform * t -190 -279 3.33∗∗ 1.18
(460) (494) (1.35) (0.83)
Group 4 * reform * t 7621 9058 -1.75∗ 1.56+
(20810) (20942) (0.78) (0.96)
Group 5 * reform * t -290 -740 -0.36 0.75
(1339) (1262) (0.83) (0.87)
R-squared 0.99 0.99 0.91 0.98
Observations 1540 1540 1540 1529
Districts 514 514 514 514
See equation (A-1) in the Appendix. Group 3, the middle quintile of districts in the pre-reform spending distributon, is
the omitted category. All regressions are weighted by the number of persons in the district in 1990. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The results are robust to exclusion
of the ﬁve biggest districts - Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing (all in Group 4), Flint and Utica (both in Group 5).Table A-2: Changes in Selected Demographic and Economic Characteristics, Michigan School Districts
(1980, 1990 and 2000 Censuses, FE Regressions)
Median Per Capita Households with Persons Below Unemployment
Household Income Income PA Income Poverty Rate
Trend (t) 11756∗∗ 5969∗∗ 3.74∗∗ 2.02∗∗ 1.08∗∗
(485) (224) (0.28) (0.31) (0.20)
Group 1 * t -2150∗∗ -1074∗∗ 0.79∗ 0.42 1.41∗∗
(769) (295) (0.37) (0.44) (0.33)
Group 2 * t -94 -329 -0.14 -0.22 0.45
(796) (307) (0.49) (0.51) (0.40)
Group 4 * t -2025 -780 4.11+ 3.45∗ 3.18+
(1899) (853) (2.11) (1.54) (1.79)
Group 5 * t 2846∗ 2331∗∗ -0.21 0.48 0.07
(1271) (702) (0.73) (0.75) (0.47)
Reform * t 2070∗∗ 1632∗∗ -8.86∗∗ -4.49∗∗ -3.51∗∗
(738) (326) (0.54) (0.54) (0.38)
Group 1 * reform * t 2140+ 820+ -1.72∗ -1.54∗ -2.06∗∗
(1336) (483) (0.70) (0.77) (0.63)
Group 2 * reform * t 310 10 0.28 0.16 -0.36
(1180) (459) (0.96) (0.88) (0.70)
Group 4 * reform * t 601 -68 -7.57+ -3.98 -4.02
(2526) (1173) (3.94) (2.55) (2.85)
Group 5 * reform * t -2518 -1074 1.49 1.67 0.62
(1783) (976) (1.34) (1.18) (0.78)
R-squared 0.93 0.93 0.89 0.96 0.86
Observations 1540 1540 1538 1540 1540
Districts 514 514 514 514 514
See equation (A-1) in the Appendix. Group 3, the middle quintile of districts in the pre-reform spending distributon, is
the omitted category. All regressions are weighted by the number of persons in the district in 1990. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The results are robust to exclusion
of the ﬁve biggest districts - Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing (all in Group 4), Flint and Utica (both in Group 5).Table A-3: Changes in Selected Demographic and Economic Characteristics, Michigan School Districts
(1980, 1990 and 2000 Censuses, FE Regressions)
Prop. of Prop. of Prop. of Less than High School Bachelor’s Degree
Whites Blacks Hispanics 12th grade Graduates or More
Trend (t) -1.65∗∗ 0.21∗ 0.97∗∗ -9.37∗∗ -5.26∗∗ 1.14∗∗
(0.30) (0.11) (0.19) (0.38) (0.49) (0.27)
Group 1 * t 0.27 -0.18 -0.15 -0.70 2.90∗∗ -0.27
(0.40) (0.23) (0.24) (0.52) (0.68) (0.41)
Group 2 * t 0.09 -0.03 -0.05 -0.59 0.88 -0.33
(0.44) (0.27) (0.24) (0.51) (0.75) (0.41)
Group 4 * t -5.55∗ 5.07∗ 0.66+ 0.26 -0.39 0.21
(2.28) (2.46) (0.35) (0.54) (1.10) (0.66)
Group 5 * t -2.10∗ 1.82∗ -0.05 1.91∗∗ -2.34∗∗ 1.36+
(0.85) (0.81) (0.21) (0.58) (0.70) (0.75)
Reform * t -1.43∗ 0.24 0.01 3.36∗∗ 4.37∗∗ 2.91∗∗
(0.57) (0.18) (0.27) (0.55) (0.75) (0.46)
Group 1 * reform * t 0.83 -0.41 0.18 -0.74 -2.28∗ -0.13
(0.73) (0.43) (0.36) (0.78) (1.09) (0.73)
Group 2 * reform * t 0.33 0.17 -0.08 0.25 -0.90 0.67
(0.43) (0.42) (0.37) (0.76) (1.14) (0.68)
Group 4 * reform * t 0.83 -2.24 0.35 0.44 1.31 -0.17
(3.03) (3.22) (0.57) (0.94) (1.59) (1.16)
Group 5 * reform * t -1.73 0.36 -0.29 0.27 1.74 1.17
(1.31) (1.18) (0.31) (0.84) (1.03) (1.30)
R-squared 0.98 0.99 0.85 0.97 0.91 0.96
Observations 1540 1540 1539 1540 1540 1540
Districts 514 514 514 514 514 514
See equation (A-1) in the Appendix. Group 3, the middle quintile of districts in the pre-reform spending distributon, is
the omitted category. All regressions are weighted by the number of persons in the district in 1990. Robust standard
errors are in parentheses. +, ∗, ∗∗ denote signiﬁcance at the 10, 5, and 1 percent levels. The results are robust to exclusion
of the ﬁve biggest districts - Detroit, Grand Rapids, Lansing (all in Group 4), Flint and Utica (both in Group 5).Figure 1. Distribution of Per Capita Housing Stock in Lowest Spending Districts, 
compared to Highest Spending Districts (Top Panel) and Upper Middle Districts 
(Bottom Panel), 1994 & 2001  
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Figure 2. Trends in Per Capita Housing Stock, Michigan School Districts, 1990-2001   
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